

# Persistent Memory Objects on the Cheap

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
# Overview

- ① Introduction and Background
- ② Design
  - Light PMO (LPMO) Design
- ③ Evaluation
  - LPMO Performance
  - CXL Performance
- ④ Conclusion



# Persistent Memory (PM)


Example: Intel Optane, CXL Memory-Semantic SSDs



## Characteristics

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


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


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


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Note: Devices with PM usually have DRAM as well



# Persistent Memory Objects (PMOs)

Primitives: `pcreate()`





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- Integrity verification at rest




# Thread Scaling

Prior work exhibited poor thread scaling



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
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


## Reasons

- PMOs are hosted entirely in PM

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## Reasons

- PMOs are hosted entirely in PM
- Encryption and integrity verification on the critical path



# CXL Devices

CXL: SOTA for PM



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## Compute Express Link

- Utilizes PCIe interface
- Direct access from CPU to memory
- Heterogeneous memory pools
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**Goal: High-Performance PMOs**



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There is a way to do this...



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...more on this later.



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# Threat Model

Goal: Protect at-rest data from disclosure/corruption





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## Out of Scope

- Side-channel attacks
- Data-remanence attacks (DRAM)



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LPMO can exploit DRAM as cache **without** hardware support  
DRAM as cache = Reconfigurable Memory



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- Primary and shadow in plaintext



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- Primary and shadow page encrypted
- Primary and shadow in plaintext
- Shadow in plaintext, primary in ciphertext




# Reconfigurable Memory Hierarchy (Part 2)

Optane PM uses local DRAM



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CXL can place system on either side of memory expander



# Reduce page fault latency

Prior work: Demand Faulting

Why not **predict** when pages are needed?



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## Prior work: Demand Faulting

Why not **predict** when pages are needed?

## Example Solution: Stream Buffer

- On fault, predict next  $X$  sequential pages (**depth**)
- Works well for access patterns amenable to prediction



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# Evaluation

## Evaluated Benchmarks

- Microbenchmarks
  - 2d Convolution (2dConv)
  - Gaussian Elimination (Gauss)
  - LU Decomposition (LU)
  - Tiled Matrix Matrix Multiplication (TMM)
- Filebench (Fileserver, VarMail, WebProxy, WebServer)
- LMDB



# Evaluation


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
Component	Specifications
MB	Supermicro X11DPi-NT
CPU	2×Intel Xeon Gold 6230 (20 cores)
DRAM	4 × 32GiB DDR4 @ 2666MHz
PM	4 × 128GiB Intel Optane DIMM
OS	AlmaLinux 9.0; Linux 5.15.157

# LPMO Performance


△ O, ○ D, □ D2, × D4, ▷ D8



(a) Gauss




(b) LU



(c) TMM

All benchmarks have better thread scaling!


# LPMO Performance



- DRAM reduces execution time by  $\approx 21\%$




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
- DRAM reduces execution time by  $\approx 21\%$
- IV + Prediction faster than original GPMO design w/o IV

# LPMO Performance - Filebench




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
# LPMO Performance - Filebench



- Only 1.19 $\times$  faster with DRAM
- 1.81 $\times$  **faster with page prediction**
- 1.37 $\times$  faster with page prediction & **IV**

# CXL Performance

Perform same tests, but emulate CXL latency




- Use opposite-node Optane
- Near configuration: cache allocated from local node
- Far configuration: cache allocated from opposite node

# CXL Performance



- With CXL alone: 50% slower than original
- With DRAM: 20% faster (despite CXL latency)

# CXL Performance - Filebench





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## LPMO

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## CXL

- Introduced Reconfigurable Memory Hierarchy
- CXL latency can be masked by LPMO optimizations



## Q & A

Thank You!

Any questions?